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PREFACE
The Asian Business History Centre was established in 1996 in 
recognition of scholarly growing interest in the business traditions of 
Asia. Its primary aim is to strengthen links with international 
research centres as well as with the business community in both 
Australia and Asia. Lecture series and conferences sponsored by the 
Centre provide a forum for our staff, students and international 
affiliates. The Centre supports an Occasional Paper series on Asian 
Business History and the Asian Business History Monograph series. 
Both series will be of particular relevance to the business and 
academic communities involved in or looking to expand their 
activities in Asia.
The Asian Business History Occasional Paper Series was 
established in 1998 to publish some of the papers presented at The 
University of Queensland Public Lecture Series on Asian Business 
History. A full list of lectures delivered follows this paper.
Occasional papers in Asian Business History are published 
for the purpose of academic discussion. Papers should be regarded as 
preliminary work in progress. Suggestions and comments should be 
addressed directly to the author.
Chi Kong Lai 
Editor and Director 
Asian Business History Centre 
The University of Queensland
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Overcoming Risk:
A Chinese Mining Company During the Nanjing Decade
Tim Wright 
Murdoch University
China’s business environment has for most of the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries has been notoriously risky and unreliable. Over 
the same period, Chinese companies have often engaged in highly 
speculative and gambling form of management,1 and in many cases 
the gamble has not come off, resulting in high rates o f failure and 
turn-over. Nevertheless management practices essentially reflected 
the objective environment; it is much more questionable whether 
there was anything fundamental in Chinese business practices which 
led to such a speculative orientation.2 When conditions were 
appropriate Chinese companies were able successfully to adopt 
“normal” patterns o f capitalist business management, and in general 
both Western and Chinese scholarship is increasingly focussing on die 
successes o f Chinese capitalism. This paper will examine these 
phenomena through an analysis o f the history o f one Chinese 
company during the period o f the Nationalist government 
(1927-1937).
If one was to look for a period o f recent Chinese history 
when business might have gone beyond the “gambling” phase and 
entered a period o f institutionalisation, the most likely candidate 
would be the 1927-1937 period. The partial reunification o f the 
country and reforms in such previously problematic areas as currency 
all attempted to lessen the risks, and the element o f gambling, in 
business ventures and to introduce a degree o f predictability.3 It would 
however, be quite wrong to imagine that that process came anywhere 
near completion in the Nanjing decade and both political factors — 
the assertiveness o f the Nationalist state, the Communist-dominated 
labour movement and the threat from Japan— and economic factors, 
predominantly the impact o f the 1930s world depression created a 
hazardous environment for business operations.
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This case study examines the success of one Chinese 
business enterprise in dealing with these risks. That success was 
exemplified by the strong growth and profit record that continued 
throughout the period — in contrast both to the situation of coal 
mining in many other countries and to the general picture of 
economic decline or “bankruptcy” painted for the Nanjing decade. It 
argues that the most serious risks faced by this industry in the 1920s 
and 1930s were political, and that a great deal of the time and effort 
of the company concerned had to be invested in overcoming those 
political risks — in this context links to the state machine had always 
been important for Chinese companies (this is not to say that the 
situation was different elsewhere). However, although the company 
was aware of the possibility of rent-seeking, and attempted to gain 
what privileges it could, its main aims in establishing links with the 
state were defensive. Thus its greatest efforts were directed into 
“regular” attempts to reduce costs and compete in the marketplace.
In none of this does the paper attempt to argue that 
Zhongxing was “typical”. As in any economy, there was a wide range 
of business responses to external risk, and of the degrees of success 
of such responses. Certainly many companies were less successful 
than Zhongxing in managing risk. But neither was Zhongxing unique: 
many other Chinese companies continued to grow and to make profits 
through the 1930s, and the macro figures confirm that any overall 
paradigm of failure is inappropriate.
Introduction: The Historiography of Modern Chinese Business
Over the past fifteen years or so there has been a dramatic change in 
the main frameworks for the study of Chinese business history; in the 
broadest sense, this change has been from an emphasis on failure to 
one on success. For most of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, business 
history studies were dominated in the West by modernization theory, 
and in China by Marxist/Maoist orthodoxy. Both frameworks 
focussed on the failures and backward nature of Chinese capitalist 
business in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
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Modernization theory postulated a series o f dichotomies 
between “traditional” and “modem” societies, and emphasised the 
degree to which pre-revolutionary China remained within the 
“traditional” paradigm. The classic work was Albert Feuerwerker’s 
brilliant study o f the China Merchants Steamship Navigation 
Company in the late nineteenth century, which concluded that the 
Company’s operations ended in failure at least partly because of 
“traditional” characteristics such as nepotism, insecurity o f merchants, 
and the overwhelming attraction o f the bureaucratic career.4 While 
few studies of twentieth century Chinese business had the clarity and 
power o f Feuerwerker’s conclusions, it is not difficult to find Western 
studies which stress business failure and inability to deal with external 
risks. A leading example is Marie Claire Bergère’s study o f the cotton 
textile industry in the 1920s.5
While the Chinese agenda was different, the conclusions 
were surprisingly similar. The political imperative for the 
Communists was to show that capitalism was a dead end for China 
and the country could not modernise and industrialise without a 
socialist revolution. Thus emphasis was again laid on the stagnation 
and bankruptcy o f the economy as a whole and the industrial sector 
in particular, and on the inability o f Chinese capitalist business 
practices to meet the challenges o f external risks in the form of threats 
from “imperialism” on the one hand, and the role o f the state 
(“bureaucratic capitalism”) on the other. Classic expressions o f this 
view include the early 1950s textbook by Meng Xianzhang,6 and the 
later orthodox compilation of lectures on modem Chinese economic 
history from Hubei University.7
From the 1970s several factors outside the field compelled 
a réévaluation. In the West, modernization theory was under criticism, 
but at the same time increased faith in the market system directed 
attention to the successes as well as the failures o f China’s market 
economy in the pre-war period. In China, the initiation o f the process 
o f economic reform at the end o f the decade involved the adoption of
“capitalist” methods o f economic management. Thus there was a
greater interest in the pre-war capitalist experience as a possible
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source of lessons for the present. At the same time, the imperative to 
justify the necessity and inevitability o f the Communist revolution 
was lessened, though not removed entirely. In both China and the 
West, these deeper social forces were complemented by changes 
within the area of scholarship, as researchers compiled quantitative 
data on economic change in that period and concluded that the old 
picture of failure was not borne out by their figures.
Leading die Western réévaluation of the performance o f the 
economy as a whole has been the work of Thomas Rawski, whose 
1989 work put the strongest case so far for growth over the whole 
economy and strong growth within industry.8 Among business studies, 
Sherman Cochran’s work on the Nanyang Brothers’ Tobacco 
Company stands out in giving much more positive evaluation of 
Chinese private business acumen in the early twentieth century.9 My 
own work both on the coal mining industry as a whole and on 
individual enterprises has contributed to the same réévaluation.
Within China, too, scholars have reinterpreted both the 
overall quantitative picture and — even more clearly than their 
Western counterparts — changed their judgement o f business 
practices.10 Leading the quantitative work on the economy as a whole 
have been the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and the Nankai 
Institute o f Economics. Their work has shown that the economy, 
especially the industrial sector, underwent continuous growth through 
most years the 1920s and 1930s, so that any conclusion o f failure 
would be inappropriate.11 Chinese studies of business practices have 
likewise discarded the old stereotypes and now argue that prewar 
capitalists were eager to employ modem management methods and 
were successful in establishing systems to deal with external 
problems.12
This paper, therefore, by focussing on a successful company, 
contributes to this réévaluation, and points to the way that at least 
some Chinese companies did manage to succeed despite of the risks 
inherent in the environment.
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Chinese Capitalism During the Nanjing Decade
The first section of this paper attempted a brief overview of the 
development of the historiography of modem Chinese business 
historiography. The history of the Nanjing decades revisits some of 
the general issues, while itself throwing up new and specific 
questions. Many scholars have suggested that, while Chinese business 
was relatively successful in the period of the 1910s and early 1920s, 
when the hand of government was relatively light, that success ended 
with the accession of the Guomindang government in 1927. Thus 
Marie-Claire Bergère defines the “golden age of the Chinese 
bourgeoisie” as ending in 1927, ushering in a period of decline.13
Mao Dun’s famous novel Twilight eloquently depicts 
Chinese business or capitalists as unable to cope with the business and 
political risks it faced. Squeezed between the power of foreign 
business on the one hand and the emerging workers’ movement on the 
other, the main protagonist is forced into bankruptcy.14 Mao Dun’s 
work has long represented an orthodoxy, certainly in China, about the 
failure of Chinese business in the 1930s: some growth may have taken 
place in the 1910s, but from the 1920s and even more in the 1930s, 
the capitalist sector declined into “bankruptcy”. Indeed it was, of 
course, written with precisely that purpose in mind.
Four maj or external problems dominated the environment for 
Chinese business during the Nanjing decade, and exposed companies 
to a series of risks — three mainly in the political area, one in the 
business area. Those four problems were: increased assertiveness on 
the part of the state; the threat from Japan; problems with the labour 
movement and the Communist Party; and the impact of the world 
depression.
One of the key ways in which the business environment 
changed around 1927 was, as identified by Bergère, the emergence of 
a much more assertive state. While comparisons with post 1949 China 
used to direct attention to the relative weakness of the Guomindang, 
the fact remains that the process of state building received a major 
new impetus from the Guomindang and as a result the Chinese state
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during the Nanjing decade was both more assertive and more able to 
impose its will than had been central governments for at least a couple 
of decades. Many scholars have seen this state as aggressively 
promoting its own interests regardless of, and to some extent at the 
expense of, those of the capitalist sector. Douglas Paauw in a seminal 
early article put this view strongly,15 and it has, since been confirmed 
by the work of Parks Coble as well as that o f Bergère herself.16
Chinese scholars in particular have conceptualised this issue 
as one of “bureaucratic capitalism” and the “four great families”, 
arguing that there was a strong tendency towards monopoly already 
exhibited in the 1930s and that increasingly the top state officials 
were getting their hands on private enterprises.17 Cochran interprets 
the decline of the Nanyang Brothers Tobacco Company in the 1930s 
in terms of the attempts by Song Ziwen to gain a controlling interest 
in the firm.18
Nevertheless, this view has not gone unchallenged. Those 
involved with the Nationalist government have argued that the 
government’s efforts to promote the economy were genuine, and did 
not represent an attempt at monopoly.19 This is also, of course, the 
predominant interpretation on Taiwan.20 Even in China, the 
quantitative study from Nankai referred to earlier states 
unambiguously that by far the largest part of the economy in the 
1930s was still privately owned, and any trends to state capitalism 
were still in the future.21 Another paper argues that the major 
Nationalist reforms, such as the nationalisation o f the banks, were 
essentially measures to provide the necessary basis for capitalist 
expansion.22
In the present paper there is a further reason for caution, in 
that most of the studies that emphasise the increased role o f the 
Nationalist State focus on Chinese business in Shanghai, which had 
been protected from the impact of the warlords but which found the 
new government much more able and willing to impose its policies in 
the city. Most coal mines were, however, in north China, where they 
had been very much exposed to the arbitrary exercise or warlord 
power, and to the disruption war and warlords brought. In that case,
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the advent o f stronger central government brought a welcome degree 
of greater stability, while the fact that its writ did not fully extend to 
the north lessened the threat it posed.
“Imperialism”, in the form of the world economy and of 
foreign enterprise in China, had long been seen as the principal 
contradiction facing Chinese capitalism. Chinese companies were 
unable to compete with either imports or the products o f foreign 
companies in China.23 But in the Nanjing decade this problem became 
intensified in the form of Japanese pressure on China. Japanese 
aggression in the North-east both had direct impacts on Chinese- 
owned companies in the area, with several coal mines, for example, 
being in practice confiscated.24 The loss o f the Northeast also 
deprived many Chinese industries o f key markets, and the 
flow-through effects o f that loss were given by many observers equal 
prominence with trends in the world economy (and with the Yangzi 
floods of 1931) in causing the downturn in the Chinese economy 
during the 1930s.
This interpretation, too, is open to some question. While 
there were no doubt some adverse effects, China’s perception of 
facing an overall threat to its national survival certainly coloured the 
observations of observers of the economic scene. As we shall see, the 
rapid industrialisation and rearmament of Japan also offered some 
opportunities to Chinese companies: most obviously it underlay the 
expansion of industry in the Northeast, but companies within China 
could also benefit. Clearly, however, in hindsight the threat from 
Japan eventually overwhelmed most of the Chinese economy.
Less prominent, for obvious reasons, in Communist writings, 
but certainly of major concern at the time, was the disruption 
threatened by the workers movement and the need for Chinese 
capitalists to adopt measures to control it. The Nationalist period is 
generally seen as a relatively quiescent one as far as labour is 
concerned, with no Communist-inspired “high tides” of the sort that 
happened in 1922 and 1927. Nevertheless labour militancy was an 
issue of continuous concern for company managers, impelling them 
in some cases to make otherwise undesirable alliances with criminal
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gangs.25
In addition, the situation in north China was again somewhat 
different. There in the mid 1920s warlord suppression had almost 
removed the threat of industrial activity in the region. There, unlike 
Shanghai, the arrival of the Nationalists, even after the purge of the 
Left Wing, was seen more as indicating a degree of liberation for 
organised labour.
Finally, the 1930s was the period of the world depression. 
Although the effects of the world depression on China’s industry are 
very controversial, with Loren Brandt in particular arguing that China 
did not experience anything that could be called a depression,26 at the 
time it was seen as a major crisis. While it appears certain that overall 
industrial output continued to grow throughout the period usually 
identified as the peak of the depression in China (1933-1935), some 
indicators and some industries were hard hit. Among the major 
industries, silk was most severely hit, with a devastating decline both 
in rural and in urban production. More generally, while output 
continued to grow, profits plummeted: the cotton textile industry 
faced a crisis of liquidity in 1935, while in coal mining the profits of 
the main mines involved in the coastal market (especially the 
Sino-British Kailuan Mining Administration) deteriorated sharply.27
External pressures such as those outlined above have been 
the focus of most discussion of Chinese business in the 1930s. 
However, some scholars have gone on to argue that Chinese business, 
with backward and often corrupt business practices, was poorly 
equipped to deal with the risks, and in fact its own incapacity 
contributed to its weakness.
The Origins of the Zhongxing Coal Mining Company
From its origins, the Zhongxing Coal Mining Company exhibited a 
number of features which made it in some respects representative of 
private Chinese companies in its period, and which were later also to 
be seen in the 1930s.28
Zhongxing was originally established by followers of Li
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Hongzhang, linking with local mining interests who had been active 
in the area for centuries.29 It was located in Yi xian in southern 
Shandong, close to the Grand Canal, and later to the Tianjin-Pukou 
railway. Its growth was slow in the late nineteenth century until it 
began its first period of expansion in the early twentieth century, led 
by Zhang Lianfen and using German technology and technicians.30 A 
major mining disaster and the death of its manager in the mid 1910s 
interrupted the growth, but the mine took advantage of the boom in 
the industry during and immediately after the first world war to post 
rapid output growth and record profits (see Chart 1 and Table 1). By 
the early 1920s it was the largest purely Chinese owned coal mining 
company in China and a major representative of national capital in 
North China.
Throughout this period the company attempted to minimize 
political risk by maintaining strong links to the state machine. Its 
earliest manager was Dai Huazao, a close aide of Li Hongzhang, and 
indeed Li was central in the development of modem mining in Yi 
xian.31 At the very beginning of the twentieth century, the company 
was reestablished in the aftermath of the Struggle for Concessions by 
Zhang Lianfen, a senior official within the Province.32 Zhang 
provided close ties with the provincial bureaucracy, ties which were 
strengthened by the substantial stake owned by the former governor 
of Shandong, Zhou Fu.33 The importance of these ties was seen when 
the official sent to investigate complaints by a small mine against 
encroachment by Zhongxing turned out to be Zhou Xuexi, son of 
Zhou Fu.34
Changes in Chinese society and politics in the first half of the 
1910s were reflected within the company, but the new management 
was also closely linked to the state machine: the former president Xu 
Shichang became Chairman of the Board, While the leading role in 
running the company was taken by Zhu Qiqian, who also served as 
negotiator on the northern side in the 1919 peace talks.35 Many other 
warlords, the men who controlled the area in which Zhongxing 
operated and the railways which it used to ship its coal, also held 
shares in the company.36
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Having said that, Zhongxing was not in the twentieth century 
a state-owned enterprise. It was clearly a private company in which 
individual officials or warlords held an interest. Indeed, Zhang 
Lianfen gained fame (or notoriety) when he was said to be the first 
official to resign his position in order to devote himself full-time to 
running a private company:37 he also advised the young Ye Jinggui to 
choose between an official career and one in business — to try to 
combine the two was to court disaster.38
As such Zhongxing became one o f the private companies 
which most successfully adapted to the risks o f China during the 
warlord period. Its output grew to a level where it was among the 
three largest private Chinese-owned coal producers, along with the 
Pingxiang mine in Jiangxi and the Zhongyuan mine in Henan; and in 
some years in the early 1920s Zhongxing was the largest producer. 
Moreover its profits were more healthy than either o f those two 
mines. Table I shows a very healthy level o f profits indeed in the 
early 1920s.
However, in the late 1920s the company fell victim to two 
types of political risk, as its earlier successful strategy o f risk 
management backfired, and Zhongxing was forced into closing the 
mine and virtually into bankruptcy.
Firstly, the company fell victim to China’s political 
instability through the disruption of its railway transport links. For 
Zhongxing, as for the all coal mines, transport of their coal to market 
was absolutely crucial to their operations, and for most mines the 
railways were the most important mode of transport. However, the 
growing civil wars in China from the early 1920s and particularly 
from the mid 1920s led to a sharp decline of transport on Zhongxing’s 
key artery, the Tianjin-Pukou (Jin-Pu) line, and from 1927 transport 
more or less ceased entirely on that line.39 Thus the mine was unable 
to ship its coal to market, except for small amounts along the Grand 
Canal, which was itself in poor condition. Sales, and therefore profits, 
declined calamitously, and eventually forced the mine to close down 
its operations.40
Second, the company fell victim to the change in political
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regime with the rise o f the Nationalists. Earlier, Zhongxing had 
attempted to avoid the arbitrary warlord demands which plagued 
many mines by establishing close ties in its ownership and its 
management with the ruling warlord-politician group in north China. 
That worked well for the company while those warlords dominated 
the region. When a new political group — the Guomindang — came 
to prominence, however, these advantages turned into outright 
disadvantages, as the Guomindang moved to implement its anti-
warlord platform.
Zhongxing found it difficult to manage the new risk posed by 
the Nationalists. It was faced by Nationalist demands for contributions 
to military campaign funds; in this it had much in common with the 
Shanghai capitalists as analysed by Coble.41 The Company proved 
unable (in its own view) or unwilling (in the view of Jiang Jieshi and 
his supporters) to meet the demands, and in 1928, Jiang announced 
the confiscation of the mine and its take-over by a Party 
reorganization committee.42
Zhongxing’s Management of Political Risk
Thus the owners and managers o f Zhongxing entered the Nanjing 
decade facing a critical political risk. But, after overcoming that 
crisis, managers had to face the other political risks outlined in an 
earlier section —  continuing relations with the Guomindang 
government; relations with Japan; and the question o f the labour 
movement. In the first case, the central strategy adopted by the 
company to overcome its problems was to attract into its management 
team people who could provide the necessary connections to the 
ruling group and thus promise a degree o f political stability. In 
response to labour problems, Zhongxing followed a stick and carrot 
approach, attempting to coopt union leaders and establish a company- 
friendly enterprise union on the one hand, but calling in the police and 
military to crush overt dissent on the other. While relations with Japan 
were not a central issue for the company politically, by the eve if  war 
they threatened to become so as pressure was mounting over the 
growing exports of coal to fuel the Japanese war machine.
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Relations with the Nationalist Government
Throughout the Nanjing decade, its relations with the Nationalist 
Government was the main focus o f political risk for Zhongxing. This 
was, o f course, particularly so in the late 1920s in the aftermath of the 
mine’s closure by Nationalist troops. In order to meet this challenge, 
the company attempted to recruit people who could provide die 
necessary links with the new regime.
In the Nanjing decade, these links were predominantly 
provided by members of the “Zhejiang Financial Clique” which 
dominated the Shanghai banking sector and to a considerable extent 
the commercial and industrial world o f China’s largest city. The 
central figure providing these linkages was Qian Yongming, at least 
to begin with the representative of Zhongxing’s creditor banks who 
became chief executive of the company in the 1930s.43 From a 
Zhejiang family, Qian (1885-1958) was bom in Shanghai and studied 
in Japan. In 1917 he started on a highly successful banking career as 
a protege of Cao Rulin in the Bank of Communications,44 o f which he 
became manager in 1919. When Liang Shiyi regained control of the 
bank from Cao in 1925, Qian resigned, but later became deputy to Gu 
Yingfen, Minister of Finance. During the Nanjing decade, he served 
as both banker and government administrator: in 1928 he worked with 
Zhang Renjie in Zhejiang,45 and he was later a government-appointed 
director of the Bank of China,46 as well as a director o f the Kincheng 
Banking Corporation,47 and many other commercial and banking 
enterprises.48 Qian was a prominent member o f the Zhejiang Financial 
Clique, in which he was closely associated with Wu Dingchang, 
Minister of Industries in the mid 1930s; this group was in turn 
associated with the wider Political Study Clique, consisting o f some 
of the more modem mid liberal elements in influential positions under 
the Guomindang.49 It was not only Zhongxing for which Qian acted 
as an intermediary with the ruling Jiang Jieshi group; he also 
performed a liaison role between Jiang and the leading Shanghai 
gangster, Du Yuesheng.50
After, apparently, some initial reluctance to take the job,
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Qian was appointed chief executive of Zhongxing in 1929, and 
remained in the post until 1937.51 To an even greater extent than had 
earlier been the case with Zhu Qiqian, however, Qian retained outside 
interests, and indeed he can have been able to devote only a small part 
o f his time to the Company’s affairs.52
This recruitment o f bankers and the shift in orientation away 
from directors with links to the warlord government was already clear 
in the leadership group which emerged from a general meeting held 
in April 1928, when the mine was still closed down. That meeting 
elected the banker Tao Xiang53 as temporary chairman seven other 
men to run the Company’s affairs.54 Many o f these seven had similar 
connections, though they mostly straddled the worlds o f politics and 
commerce. Wang Yintai and Tang Zaichang were politicians with 
financial and industrial connections.55 Lin Xinggui was a lawyer and 
major creditor of the firm.56 Hu Yingchu was a shareholder in the 
Kincheng Banking Corporation and an official in the Ministry of 
Finance.57 Among the group, Zhou Xingtang was the most purely 
commercial figure, being head of the Hankou Chamber o f Commerce 
in 1923, and a major figure in central Chinese banking, though 
originating in Zhejiang.58 Hu Bijiang, one o f two back-up 
representatives, was the head o f the China and South Sea Bank.59 The 
old guard still retained some presence: Li Shaoji, the son o f Li 
Yuanhong, represented this group, and in fact he was to continue as 
prominent in several industrial enterprises in the 1930s.60 Hu Xilin, 
the veteran mine manager, is a similar case, though he does not seem 
to have had any political connections.
Representing even more clearly the power o f the Shanghai 
banking sector was the management team put in place from around 
1929 which was to see the company through to the beginning o f the 
war. Details o f this team are given in Table 2. This shows that men 
from the world o f banking replaced the warlords and politicians as the 
single most important group in the Company. Although Zhu Qiqian 
was “kicked upstairs” to become Chairman in 1929, he was succeeded 
by Ye Jinggui, the Chairman o f the National Commercial Bank. Other 
key figures in the Company’s management with connections to
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banking included Qian Yongming himself, Ye Zhuotang, Wang 
Yintai, Zhou Zuomin and Ren Fengbao. Li Shaoji, Zhang Xueliang, 
Zhang Zhongping and Zhu Qiqian remained of the old guard, but no 
longer did they command the influence within and outside the 
Company that they once had done.
It was in their linkages to other figures or groups in society 
where the significance of most of these individuals lay. As suggested 
above, the Zhejiang connection remained an important one,61 with Ye 
Jinggui representing the main link between the Company’s old owners 
(he had married the daughter of one o f the earlier leaders o f the 
company, Zhu Zhongqi, as his second wife, and was a protege of Qing 
official and Zhongxing shareholder Zhao Ersun),62 and the new 
dominant group centred around the Zhejiang Financial Clique. That 
clique encompassed most o f the key bankers and industrialists in 
Shanghai, centring around those originating in Ningbo.63 As such they 
were the centre of China’s new capitalist class which had emerged in 
the late 1910s and early 1920s.64
No sharp line, however, distinguished this group either from 
the old warlord-politician elite or from the new bureaucratic 
capitalists of the Guomindang. Thus both Qian Yongming and Zhou 
Zuomin had started their careers as proteges of Cao Rulin and the 
New Communications Clique, and continued to protect their old 
mentor even after his fall from power.65 Qian was also a fellow 
student of Wang Zhengting, who was also from Zhejiang and whose 
varied career included periods as Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
acting premier, as well as managing the Liuhegou Coal Mining 
Company.66 The two families later became connected by marriage.67
Perhaps o f more immediate importance were the links the 
Zhejiang group had with Jiang Jieshi and his regime. Any view of 
Jiang’s regime as being in any simple way “based” on the Shanghai 
capitalists has been refuted by Parks Coble’s work, which stresses the 
contradictions between the two groups. But Qian Yongming in 
particular was close to Jiang: he had been urged by Wu Dingchang to 
approach Jiang’s group in 1926-27, and served as Vice-Minister of 
Finance for Jiang, being largely instrumental in the issue of the 2.5%
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bond issue.68 Qian and the new mine manager Chen Jinghan also had 
close ties to Chen Lifu.69 Ye Jinggui was also a close associate of 
Jiang Jieshi and of Song Ziwen,70 while die auditor Chen Jie also fell 
into Song’s group.
All these connections were utilized to surmount the crisis in 
mid 1928, when Zhongxing was under order of confiscation by the 
new government. The Company successfully mobilized merchant and 
banker groups across the country to intervene on its behalf. It had 
itself held a general meeting of its shareholders in the Italian 
concession in Tianjin, when Zhang Zhongping reported on the 
negotiations with the government and the shareholders agreed to 
petition Jiang to return the company.71 But pressure from this source 
alone would have had little effect; much more important was the 
support of the Shanghai banks. On 2 September the Shanghai 
Bankers’ Association sent a telegram to Jiang requesting him to 
rescind the order: their arguments were based on the specific interests 
involved, with their members holding shares and bonds of the 
Company, and on the general need for business confidence for the 
success of the government’s investment programme.72 This telegram 
was backed up by a similar one from the Shanghai Chamber of 
Commerce, also supporting the Company’s version of their failure to 
raise the one million yuan.™ They were not to be denied: after 
negotiations in Shanghai between bank representatives and Song 
Ziwen, the order was rescinded on 21 September 1928, following the 
agreement of the chief representative of the Company, Li Shaoji, to 
pay the Ch$l million, a sum which was to be raised by the banks.
This pressure worked not only to enable the re-opening of the 
mine, but also to blunt the attack on the warlord shareholders in the 
company. Thus, despite all the anti-warlord rhetoric, in the end the 
shares of only two warlords — one of whom was dead, the other long 
discredited — were confiscated. Early discussions had marked down 
the shares of Ni Sichong, Zhang Xun, Zhang Huaizhi and Zhang 
Jingyao as definitely deserving confiscation, and raised the possibility 
of confiscating those of Wang Zhanyuan, Jin Yunpeng, Pan Fu and 
Zhu Qiqian.75 A joint report by the Ministries of Agriculture and
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Mines and of die Interior in March 1929, however, recommended that 
to start with they should confiscate only the holdings of Ni Sichong 
and Zhang Jingyao.76 Zhang Jingyao, a minor warlord of the Anhui 
clique, had held only Ch$27,200 shares, though the family of Ni 
Sichong had rather larger holdings of Ch$235,700. Ni had died in 
1920, but his family had substantial holdings in a number of north 
China mining and industrial enterprises,77 holding the controlling 
interest, for example, in the Lieshan mine, which was also 
confiscated.78 The process of confiscation was by no means simple, 
however, and dragged on for some time. Later in 1929, Ni’s son 
claimed that his family had sold all but Ch$20,000 shares in 1926,79 
and two of the purchasers also wrote the Ministry in September 1932 
claiming they had bought the shares in good faith from Ni’s family 
and arguing that they should not be confiscated.80 Even in the case of 
Zhang Jingyao, it appears that the family attempted to recover the 
shares in 1932.81 Throughout the 1930s, therefore, as shown in Table 
3, Zhongxing retained many links with the old warlord system 
through its shareholders.
For all its links with the government, however, no more in 
this period than in earlier ones did Zhongxing cease to be a private 
company. The confiscation of the shares carried with it the right to 
appoint one director, and Chen You, from the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Mines, was appointed in the late 1920s.82 However, the 
government seems to have little success in exerting any control over 
the company, and a secret report by Gu Lang in May 1931 claimed 
that Zhongxing failed to inform the Ministry of its intention to hold 
the 19th General Meeting or to report to the Ministry afterwards; that 
was a clear violation of the rights of a shareholder which held V23 of 
all shares.83 By the mid 1930s it was not clear which if any of the 
directors was the government’s nominee. Thus during the Nanjing 
decade, Zhongxing remained outside the control of the state; it 
probably remained as purely a private company as most in China, and 
indeed elsewhere.
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Labour Relations
Labour problems were another aspect of the political risks faced by 
the company during the Nanjing decade, though in general they were 
kept under control. They were part of a much broader competition 
between the Nationalists and the communists for the allegiance of and 
control over the Chinese labour force.
Labour management became an important problem to be 
overcome by the Company, especially in the early 1930s. Broadly the 
company at various times adopted one or more of three strategies: 
attempting to coopt union leaders and establish friendly unions; 
relying on local state power to crush militants; and buying off the 
workers with some wage rises. Underlying these was also the “divide 
and rule” strategy of dividing the workforce into two groups: the 
“internal workers”, hired and paid directly by the company, and 
generally comprising the more highly skilled segment of the 
workforce; and the “external workers”, hired and paid through 
contractors and providing most of the unskilled labour.
Unlike in Shanghai, the Nanjing decade saw in north China 
and in the coal mining sector an increase in the risk posed by labour 
militancy. Not only the Communists but also the Nationalists saw it 
as their mission to introduce some labour organisation among the 
miners of north China. The struggle between the two parties over the 
allegiance of the workers introduced another focus of conflict into the 
situation.
Not surprisingly, the main push for militancy came from the 
activities of the Chinese Communist Party. Although the first signs of 
union activity had been seen in 1925,84 it was 1926 before the Party 
sent an organizer to attempt to “raise the consciousness” especially of 
the skilled workers; he succeeded in recruiting ten members to the 
Party and at the end of the year a union was established with fifty or 
so members.85 A non-Communist source describes the early union 
leaders as “very extreme”.86 Given the poor working and living 
condition of most, there was a ready response to the Communist 
message and, after a brief occupation of the area by Nationalist troops
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in mid 1927, Zhongxing’s workers held a meeting and went on strike 
to press for sixteen demands, which covered most of the spectrum of 
issues over wages, conditions and union recognition.
Management’s reaction to the strike (which was probably not 
very effective as the mine had shut down for other reasons) was 
largely along the lines of conciliation and cooptation. Thus they 
moved to establish a workers’ association to promote cooperation 
between labour and capital, and tried to get support from the 
Nationalists, who were tom between wanting to support the workers 
against the warlords who controlled Zhongxing, and a desire to limit 
the workers’ movement. In the end the workers accepted limited 
concessions from the Company in a situation where the Nationalist 
army retreated back to Xuzhou.87
Through the late 1920s and early 1930s, the company was 
involved in a three-way struggle to win the allegiance of the workers; 
as well as management, the Communist Party and the Nationalist 
party, from their reooccupation of the area in mid 1928, struggled to 
gain the support of the workers. The environment was not very 
favourable for worker organization, as the mine was closed, the 
Company confiscated, and the Nationalists’ “Reorganization 
Committee” indisposed to cater to the workers’ demands. The 
Communist Party sent a new representative, Zhang Fulin, to organize 
the workers around a demand for the restoration of work. For its party 
the Company attempted to undermine this union and set up a “yellow” 
union based on skilled workers, though this move seems to have been 
largely unsuccessful. The Nationalist representative and head of the 
“Reorganization Committee”, Yu Feipeng, however, arranged for a 
man called Zhou Xuechang to reorganize the union; Zhou, an “old 
hand in suppressing the workers’ movement” according to the 1959 
history, arranged for the arrest of the Communists, and eventually for 
a Company-sponsored union, which did succeed in gaining some 
improvements in conditions.88
Cooptation was no easy answer, however, since, as indicated 
above, poor conditions did create a basis for radicalism among the 
workers. Demands for improved conditions, and for something to be
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done about the widespread unemployment among the miners after the 
closure of the mine, dragged even the Nationalist organizers to the 
left. Thus it was only in December 1930 that a formal “yellow” union 
was finally established, after a number o f organizers had been 
dismissed for being too radical.89 In the following year the workers 
mounted a go-slow in protest against the Company offer o f a 9-10% 
pay rise, and in the end achieved a 15-16 % rise.90
Although the economic situation was unfavourable to labour 
organization in that demand for labour was low, and although the new 
authorities had at best an ambivalent attitude towards the workers, this 
period of union activity did succeed in substantially improving the 
wages and position of the workers. This was in the context of broader 
political changes, and was reflected in many other mines across north 
China. As Table 4 shows, wages of unskilled workers rose by around 
60% between 1926 and 1931. These are only money wages, and no 
price series is available for Zaozhuang, but in north China as a whole 
wholesale prices rose by only 25 per cent over the same period. Other 
improvements in conditions included an increase in the amount of 
compensation paid on the death of a miner at work up to 1-2 years’ 
wages for a directly hired worker and Ch$200 for a contract worker.91
By the 1930s, mobilization o f labour was becoming very 
much linked to another major political risk facing business, that is the 
threat from Japan.92 Zaozhuang there had been disputes between 
union and management over the workers’ desire to mount 
anti-Japanese demonstrations in September 1931 and January 1932.93 
The Japanese attack on Shanghai not only provoked such disputes but 
also undermined the Company’s major market and forced it to cut 
back production and attempt to economize on labour costs; indeed a 
workers meeting over this issue was broken up by mine police.94 
Nevertheless the workers contributed 6000 yuan to the cause of the 
armies resisting the Japanese attack on Shanghai.95
The workers’ nationalist outrage provided some basis for 
Communist Party organisation, though other aspects of the 
environment were less favourable. In 1931 a Communist Party 
meeting at Xuzhou agreed that political work at the mine was very
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difficult, both because of the white terror, and because of the 
unfavourable economic environment. Two party members sent to 
Zaozhuang succeeded, however, in recruiting a further ten members 
plus twenty activists by spring 1932, and these people were to be key 
figures in the major strike that took place that year.96
The 1932 strike involved both nationalist issues and the 
question of the relative treatment of contract workers and those 
directly hired by the Company. This latter issue flared up in June 
when Zhongxing decided only to pay bonuses to directly hired 
workers, ignoring the contract workers. By 10 July most of the 
contract workers were out on strike. A meeting on 13 July was 
addressed by the local Communist leader, who demanded a 50% rise 
in wages, abolition of the contract labour system and an eight hour 
day, among other things.97
The level of the threat to the Company was probably 
indicated by the fact that it moved quickly to adopt a strategy of 
ruthless suppression. Management thus attempted to gain the support 
of the authorities, reporting (probably correctly) that Communist 
agitation was behind the strike. At a meeting on 19 July the 
Communist leader and several others were arrested; they were later 
executed in Jinan after having refused to betray the union. This move, 
together with Company efforts to recruit scab labour and buy off 
union leaders and the transfer of army units from Lincheng, resulted 
in the failure of the strike, and the secretary of the provincial governor 
successfully negotiated a return to work with only minor concessions 
on Zhongxing’s part.98 A later source attributed the disaster to the 
influence of Wang Ming’s leftist adventurist policies.99
The execution of its organizers at Jinan was a serious blow 
to the Communist Party, but it could not completely remove the basis 
for radical action among the workers. Thus at the end of the year four 
more men were sent to Zaozhuang, one of whom ran a small medicine 
shop there, and carried out general education. Repression at Xuzhou 
left Zaozhuang as the centre for activities in the region, and, despite 
the best efforts of the authorities, fifty or so workers were recruited 
into the Party.
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Company and government efforts to counter Communist 
efforts by coopting the union movement and establishing a “yellow” 
union controlled by the Nationalists continued to run into problems, 
being tom to some extent between the demands o f the workers and the 
policy o f the government; there was also some contradiction between 
the provincial government and the national government 
representatives running the union.100 Further disputes, again over the 
contract system, took place in May 1933 and July 1934, though the 
Nationalists revoked the right to strike on grounds o f national 
emergency.101 In 1933, worker militancy forced the union to support 
the demands of the workers.102
Unfortunately no detailed information is available to indicate 
whether this activity led to any overall deterioration o f the cost 
structure of the mine through higher wage costs. Productivity in the 
form of output per worker shift rose rapidly in the 1930s, but in a 
situation where a large rise in wages had earlier taken place without 
any corresponding rise in productivity, where there was still basically 
a surplus of labour, and where demand and prices were depressed by 
the world depression, it is probably unlikely that the workers derived 
much benefit from it. A Communist union organiser recalling events 
later claimed that the action did lead to improved welfare facilities for 
contract workers.103
Dealings with Japan
While the threat from Japan probably played a less central role for 
Zhongxing than it did for other companies, Japanese expansionism 
did provide both opportunities and problems for the mine during the 
1930s. It has already been shown above how the Japanese threat 
became a central theme for labour mobilisation, particularly after the 
occupation of the Northeast in 1931. But other aspects o f Japan’s 
activities were also important.
The attack on Shanghai in January 1932 led to a sharp and 
unexpected downturn in the industrial economy of the lower Yangzi 
and a consequent contraction in the demand for coal.104 Given that at
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the same time gold currencies were falling steeply as against silver, 
the Shanghai coal market became ultra-competitive, and Zhongxing 
was forced sharply to reduce the price of coal.
On the other hand, Japanese rearmament greatly strengthened 
the coal market in Japan in the mid 1930s, and created opportunities 
for Chinese mines to sell high grade coal in particular to Japan. 
Zhongxing’s sales in the Japanese market climbed steeply from 
around 50,000 tonnes in 1934 to an expected 320,000 in 1937; its 
success in Japan was the result of the high quality of its coal, and the 
Japanese market was one of the most profitable areas for the 
company.105
It did, however also expose the company to nationalist 
criticism. Thus on the very eve of the outbreak of the war, the 
Shanghai Coal Guild approached the Military Affairs Commission 
and Jiang Jieshi himself criticising both Zhongxing and the Kailuan 
Mining Administration for selling coal to Japanese heavy industry 
while at the same time trying to monopolise the Chinese market and 
raise prices there. They denounced the companies for their lack of 
patriotic awareness.106
Of course, after July 1937, the Japanese threat materialised 
in a massive way, as Japanese troops invaded north China and in 1938 
occupied Zaozhuang, taking over the mine for operation under 
Japanese military control.
Management of Business Risk
Political problems on the whole dominated the business environment 
in China during the 1930s. Nevertheless, there were also significant 
problems from a business angle, mainly in the form of downward 
price pressures, which resulted both from factors specific to the coal 
industry and from general economic conditions in China.
Within the coal industry, there was general excess capacity. 
This had been to some extent disguised in the 1920s, because of the 
inability of many mines in Hebei, Henan and Shanxi to get their coal 
to market. As, however, the railways recovered from the disruption of
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the late 1920s, and coal from a number of mines which had invested 
heavily in productive capacity in the boom of the late 191 Os and early 
1920s, came on to the market, supply began to exceed demand. With 
the growth of some new mining areas, particularly Huainan in Anhui 
(a major new government-owned mine) and Boshan in Shandong 
(where there was rapid expansion o f output from medium sized and 
partly modernised mines), there was growing price competition in the 
main markets.
More widely, the 1930s was the period o f the world 
depression, which also had an impact in China, to some extent during 
1929-1931 through the decline o f the silk industry, but much more 
seriously in the years 1932-1935. During those years the impact o f the 
depression, particularly through the rise in the value of silver and the 
consequent appreciation o f the Chinese currency, was joined by the 
effects of the 1931 Yangzi floods and the Japanese attacks in the 
northeast and on Shanghai, to create a fragile commercial atmosphere 
and led to downward pressure on prices in the coal market.
In many other countries, coal mining was among the worst 
“basket cases” of the depression. The terminal decline o f the British 
and American coal industries, and the attempts to remedy that by 
increasing the role of government, is a well-known story.107 In India, 
too, coal mining entered a sharp, though temporary decline.108 Also 
in Japan, competitive pressures forced the industry into a serious 
rationalisation effort and into the formation of a cartel along the lines 
experienced in Europe.109
In China, however, the situation was less dire. On an 
industry-wide basis, the fact that industrial output continued to grow 
through the period meant that demand, while slowing down, did not 
experience the catastrophic falls that took place in other countries. In 
addition, the very recovery of the railway system, which caused 
problems in other respects, nevertheless allowed a return to relative 
normalcy in the 1930s and seemed a boon, despite die problems with 
demand.
The effect of the depression on coal mining made itself felt 
firstly through currency fluctuations in 1932-1933— most notably the
23
collapse of the Japanese yen against China’s currency — which led 
to a sharp fall in the price of Japanese and Manchurian coal and 
thence to a switch in demand away from Chinese coal to Japanese 
coal. Although that switch was reversed by the imposition of a tariff 
in May 1933, the general industrial stagnation of the years 1932-1935 
resulting mainly from the influence of the world depression but also 
from the Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932 and the after-effects of 
the Yangzi floods, meant that total demand for coal was fairly static, 
increasing competition for a share of the market.
These external factors led to severe downward pressure on 
Zhongxing’s prices through much of the 1930s. After setting their 
prices at a low level in 1928-1930 in order to try to regain customers, 
Zhongxing was able to benefit from the favourable exchange rates in 
1930-1931. However, from 1932 the company was forced to follow 
other Chinese coals in 1932 by sharply cutting their prices from 
around Ch$22.5/ton of run-of-mine-coal in 1931 to Ch$14.4 in late 
1 9 3 2  no por tjjg following three years, it would appear that prices 
remained at a similar level; in general coal prices rose in late 1936 
and 1937, though we have no specific information for Zhongxing.
Zhongxing therefore faced a series of business risks and 
uncertainties if it was to maintain and increase its sales than it had 
done in the early 1920s. Zhongxing’s response to this pressure on 
prices encompassed both supply and demand. The company 
introduced a major new programme of modernization after its 
reopening in 1929. This involved the hiring of a foreign engineer and 
the use of foreign equipment. The new engineer, a Herr Klicker, had 
earlier worked in the Jingxing and Zhengfeng mines in Hebei, and had 
considerable experience in China.111 There was strong opposition to 
his appointment as chief engineer from the rest of the staff, who both 
attacked his initial appointment,112 and later petitioned against him, 
accusing him of incompetence and favouritism.113 The management, 
however, backed him up, and he stayed on until the war, and indeed 
under the Japanese after 1937.114
Klicker introduced a far-reaching modernization programme, 
shifting the focus of output away from the company’s
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semi-modemised mines and indeed away from its earliest modem pit. 
Apart from closing the traditional pits, Klicker also downgraded the 
older south pit, concentrating output on the new north pit, where 
capacity was increased from 1400 to 2000 tons/day.115 Finally, he 
embarked on the construction of a third modem pit with a capacity of 
over 2000 tons/day.116 Thus Zhongxing had by 1934 a total capacity 
of over 5000 tons/day, allowing it to raise its annual output in the mid 
1930s to over 1.5 million tons.
In addition, Klicker made Zhongxing into the most modem 
Chinese coal mine as far as its equipment was concerned. Most 
importantly, underground operations, especially haulage, were 
thoroughly electrified, so that electric tramways were used in all the 
main galleries, though mules, or even human power, were still used 
in some of the side galleries.117 Moreover, in some respects 
Zhongxing was technologically more progressive even than Kailuan, 
the largest and most modem pit in China proper, but under British 
domination. Zhongxing had long used the longwall system of mining 
in its main seams, and was now alone among prewar Chinese coal 
mines in experimenting with the use of mechanical coal cutters: it had 
two Flottmann chain coal cutters as well as using ball type shaking 
conveyors to serve the most modernized coal faces.118
Technological dependence on Europe continued in this 
period. Not only was the chief engineer German, but the main items 
of equipment were imported: the winding gear for the new pit came 
from Switzerland, and most of the electrical equipment from 
Siemens.119 China did not yet have an engineering industry 
sufficiently developed to manufacture such equipment, though 
Zhongxing was building up a considerable repair and manufacturing 
capacity itself, at least for the simpler machinery.120
While foreign engineers were hired to supervise 
technological modernization, however, it was the Chinese owners of 
the company who made the basic policy decisions. Moreover, under 
the chief engineer, the technical personnel were also Chinese, and 
Zhongxing had a reputation for insisting on competence in this area 
- a reputation rare among Chinese firms.121
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This programme of technological modernization was 
successful in achieving a substantial fall in production costs and rise 
in labour productivity. Production costs had shown few signs of 
falling in the 1920s, and rose sharply in the late 1920s and early 
1930s, partly as a result o f under-utilization of capacity and partly as 
the result of a strong rise in wages. This high cost created an incentive 
for the modernization programme of the 1930s, the success o f which 
very clearly emerges from Table 5. During the 1930s costs per ton fell 
by some 40%, output per worker shift rose by 30%; this record is all 
the more impressive considering the inevitable trend towards 
diminishing returns in an extractive industry. It is unlikely that many 
companies, if  any at all, matched this record o f technological progress 
in the 1930s, and its lower costs left Zhongxing in a stronger position 
to compete in the increasingly competitive lower Yangzi market.
The other way in which Zhongxing was able to contain its 
costs was by improving its transport network. It did this partly by 
rent-seeking using its links to the government and railway 
administration. Qian Yongming used his ties to Song Ziwen and Chen 
Lifu to re-establish the Company's enjoyment of the lowest freight 
rates in China: the 1959 Company history calculated that, had 
Zhongxing had to follow the normal rates, annual transport costs in 
1930 would have been around Ch$3.6 million, whereas actual costs 
were Ch$880,000. As most coal mines enjoyed some form of special 
contract, this very greatly exaggerates the benefits to Zhongxing, but 
nevertheless it did enjoy very cheap transport.122 Similarly, Qian used 
his ties to Song to defeat an attempt by the Huaian customs office to 
charge the Company 68.5c/ton special tax on its coal. Thus successive 
meetings of Zhongxing praised the contributions of Qian in their 
reports.123
Zhongxing not only took advantage o f the recovery o f the
railway, but also undertook a major new investment initiative further 
to cut its transport costs. The economics o f land and water transport 
meant that the greater die reliance o f a company on the former, even 
if  that was by rail, the higher its cost in the final market.124 Thus this 
initiative took the form of the opening o f a new route to the sea which
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reduced the length o f railway transportation necessary.
Zhongxing by no means abandoned its previous route down 
die railway to Pukou, and thence along the Yangzi to Shanghai; 
indeed it built a Ch$500,000 new depot there in 1934.125But die long 
rail haul, even with the exceptionally favourable terms Zhongxing 
enjoyed, remained expensive when most o f Shanghai's coal travelled 
most o f the way by water. Moreover traffic on the Tianjin-Pukou 
railway had not yet fully recovered from the civil wars, with a 
shortage o f rolling stock restricting operations —  in 1932 the 
Company actually signed a contract with the Beijing-Shenyang line 
for the lease o f four whole trains, to be used solely to carry its coal.126 
This shortage o f capacity left the line in a weak position to question 
Zhongxing’s plans to expand in a different direction, even though it 
foresaw the loss o f business.
In this context Zhongxing began to investigate the possibility 
o f using the new port o f Lianyungang, which was being constructed 
at the terminus o f th <$-Hai by the Netherlands Harbour Works of
Amsterdam.127 In order to be able to make use of this port, which was 
much nearer the mine area than was Pukou, Zhongxing had its railway 
to Taierzhuang extended as far as Zhaodun where it joined the 
Long-Hai. This extension was constructed by the Long Hai with the 
aid of a 1 million yuan bond issue raised by Zhongxing and lent to the 
railway.128 Work progressed smoothly, and the line was finished in 
February 1935 and opened the next month,129 though soon afterwards 
it was closed for several months by severe floods.130
At Lianyungang, Zhongxing built its own wharfe, which it 
finished in 1936.131 Qian Yongming also set up the Company's own 
shipping line, and by 1935 it owned two ships and had another two on 
long-term loan.132 Although transport costs to Shanghai at least 
initially seem to have been reduced only by about 7% from Ch$3.20 
to Ch$2.96/ton,133 the Company hoped that the economies o f scale 
consequent on the increased use o f Lianyungang would further reduce 
its costs.
The opening of the railway link to and the construction o f the 
port at Lianyungang showed yet again the vigour of Zhongxing in
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cutting costs where possible, and thus in competing in the major 
national coal market in Shanghai. As a result of these cost cutting 
measures, the fragmentary figures which are available for the 
company's costs at the final market indicate that even at the lower 
prices Zhongxing was able to make a substantial profit on it sales: the 
cost to the company of selling coal in Shanghai seems to have been 
between Ch$10.5 and 11.5/ton, leaving around Ch$2.00 profit.134 
These moves probably left the company in as good a position as its 
location allowed, and further efforts were directed not so much at cost 
cutting as to the regulation of prices and demand in the final market.
In addition to these attempts on the supply side to reduce 
production and transport costs, Zhongxing also attempted to address 
the pressure on prices by participating in attempts to control the 
market. While such attempts were possibly the most important 
response to similar problems in other countries, they were less salient 
in China, both because the problems were less dire and because the 
level of institution-building by the state and by business was at a 
lower level. Nevertheless Zhongxing joined in both partial and 
national attempts to control the market.
Thus Zhongxing came to an agreement with the KMA in 
1934 to regulate sales in the Yangzi valley.135 This agreement was 
renewed for the next two years and indeed extended to south China 
and Japan in 1936. Although the KMA recognized the strong position 
of Zhongxing as a result of the superior quality of its coal, they hoped 
that the agreement would give some relief from the generally 
depressed coal prices.136 Even in this context personal as well as 
purely commercial connections were important: as KMA’s manager 
reported, “A most fortunate circumstance and a quite fortuitous one 
is that the Chinese Manager of the Chung Hsing [Zhongxing] Mining 
Company with whom MacFeat is negotiating happens to have been a 
student at Glasgow University at the same time as MacFeat”.137
When the government attempted to establish a national cartel 
in mid 1936, Zhongxing was again at the forefront of the moves.138 
Qian Yongming and Zhongxing's secretary Tang Zaichang had visited 
Japan in 1935 to study the organization of the coal industry there, and
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had come back very impressed by the cartel in operation there.139 The 
Minister o f Industry, Wu Dingchang, was a close associate o f the 
bankers who ran Zhongxing, and the scheme that emerged favoured 
the established mines such as Zhongxing and the KMA. This very fact 
predisposed the expanding mining areas o f central Shandong and 
Anhui to refuse to join, with the result that at the end o f the year 
Zhongxing joined with the KMA and the Jincheng Bank to form the 
Huazhong Coal Industry Company to attempt to control the Shanghai 
market. In spring 1937 the same parties joined with three other banks 
to form a national company to control coal sales. These moves had 
some initial success in undermining the position o f the central 
Shandong mines in Shanghai and in attaining a rise in prices. This 
rise, however, came in the context of a general recovery o f the 
market, which made regulation less necessary, at least in the short 
term. In the longer term powerful economic forces were working 
against the success o f the venture, and it is unlikely that it would have 
had any lasting effect.
Conclusion
What lessons, therefore, does the history of the Zhongxing company 
offer for our understanding of the operation of Chinese business in the 
early twentieth century in general and during the Nanjing decade in 
particular? Of course we must state again here that there is no claim 
that Zhongxing was “typical”, but it can nonetheless function as a 
case study or example to test some of the more general propositions 
about the history of Chinese business.
It shows that, given continuing industrial growth and 
therefore underlying demand, it was possible for well run and well 
situated companies in pre-war China to post highly successful results 
in terms of output growth and profits. It lends no support to the idea 
that China’s industrial sector in particular was “bankrupt” or 
“stagnant” during the 1920s and 1930s. Rather, as the title of this 
paper suggests, it contributes to that body of opinion which stresses 
the success of the economy in that period.
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This history certainly points to the importance of developing 
good connections with the state authorities: such connections were 
indispensable in getting the mines reopened after their confiscation in 
1928. Having said that, however, there is little hard evidence that the 
company was unable to operate as a private entity once it was 
reopened, or that it faced irresistible pressures to be integrated into the 
structure of Nationalist “bureaucratic capitalism”. Indeed the 
company was able to manage relatively well the political risks 
inherent in China’s political system and in the emergence of the 
labour movement. Neither it nor most other entities in China were 
able to cope with the effects of the materialisation of the Japanese 
menace from 1937.
Finally, it shows that Chinese companies were able to adopt 
“regular” methods to deal with business risk. While Zhongxing was 
no more averse to a bit of rent-seeking than other companies 
throughout the world, its main responses to downward price pressures 
took the form of technological change and cost cutting on the one 
hand and attempts to manage the market on the other. In this it shows 
similarities rather than differences from its counterparts elsewhere in 
the world.
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APPENDICES
CHART 1:
OUTPUT AND SALES OF THE ZHONGXING COMPANY,
1899-1936
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Year
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
TABLE 1:
PROFITS AND DIVIDENDS OF ZHONGXING 
COAL MINING COMPANY, 1913-1936
Profits (‘000 yuan) Profits Dividend
or loss (-)
a) b) as a % of Ch$/tonne
revenue
-55
216 1.09 10%
197 197 0.83
-104
310 0.89
581 1.36 45%
1947 1603 3.09-3.75 20%
2622 2204 3.87-4.61 25%
2903 2408 3.46-4.18 30%
1805 2.70
2785 2050 29.5 2.63-3.57 20%
3633 2624 35.0 3.33-4.61 22%
2128 2128 24.3 2.46 16%
744 744 10.0 0.91 8%
5 5 nil nil nil
-1596 -1596 loss loss
-1654 -1654 loss loss
-1034 -1034 loss loss
-270 -270 loss loss
22 1566 nil 0.03-2.05
1378 1655 13.1 1.41-1.69 10%
1897 2153 15.0 1.69-2.24
1970 2846 14.0 1.50-2.17
1935 2161 13.6 1.51-1.69 12%
4463 2.57
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Sources:
Profits:
a) series from Yan Zhongping, Zhongguo jindai jingji shi tongji ziliao xuanji 
(Collection of statistical materials on modem Chinese economic history)
(Beijing: Kexue chuban she, 19SS), p. 1SS, which uses a company report for
1914 and the various General Statements of the Mining Industry for 1917-
1931,1933-1934; 1932 from Di si ci Shandong kuangye baogao, p. 127; the
1933 figure is taken from Zhang Huiruo, Di wu ci Shandong kuangye baogao
(Fifth report on mining in Shandong) (Jinan, 1936), p. 326.
b) series taken from Zhong[guo] gong[chandang] Zaozhuang kuangwu ju
weiyuanhui, with Shandong daxue lishi xi and Zhongguo kexue yuan
Shandong fen yuan lishi yanjiu suo, Zaozhuang meikuang shi (History of the
Zaozhuang mine) (Jinan: Shandong renmin chuban she, 1959) (hereafter
ZMS), pp. 22, 30, 45.
Profits as a percentage of revenue: Zhang Huiruo, Di wu ci Shandong 
kuangye baogao, p. 326; Minami Manshu Tetsudd Kabushiki Kaisha, 
Chosabu, Ekiken tanden chasa shiryo (Research data on the Yi xian coal 
field) (hereafter ETCS) (Dalian, 1937), p. 34, using figures for profit as in 
those sources and column a).
Profit per ton: range using figures in a) and b) and output as shown in Table
1 .
Dividends: Xie Jiarong, Di er ci Zhongguo kuangye jiyao (General statement 
of the Chinese mining industry, no. 2) (Beijing: Nongshang bu dizhi diaocha 
suo, 1926), p. 37 (1918-1920); Hou Defeng, Di san ci Zhongguo kuangye 
jiyao (General statement of the Chinese mining industry, no. 3) (Beijing: 
Nonghsang bu dizhi diaocha suo, 1929), p. 98 (1913, 1922-1925); North 
China Herald, 30 June 1928 (1917); KYZB 254 (14 September 1933):211 
(1932); ETCS, p. 101(1935).
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TABLE 2:
ZHONGXING CHIEF PERSONNEL, 1929-1936
Name
Chairmen of the Board
Zhu Qiqian (1929-1934) f t  %
Ye Jinggui (1934 ) H H H  
Chief Executive
Qian Yongming ( 1929 ) $$ ,]< li)|
Managing Directors 
Luo Yisheng/Luo F-aji i n ' ! -  
Zhang Shuchcng/Zhang Wenfu % ')  
Li Shaoji (1931)
Ye Jinggui (1931) H i m  
Zhuang Yikui iff H  ÎÉ ( 1931 )
Directors
Chen Jinghan Wifi'S?
Hu Xilin (1931)
Li Shaoji $ £ ? £
SuTaiyu fà fk fe  
Wang Yintai 
Ye Zhuotang
Zhang Xueliang £4
Zhang Zhongping
Zhou Jingtang
Zhou Zuomin fifj IC
Zhu Qiqian
Zhuang Rensong
Auditors
Chang Yaokui ^  1®-^ ( 1931 )
Chen Jie Wi/i"
Ren Fenghao 
Xu Jiean/ Xu Rongting 
Zhou Y ican J§) III ( 1931 )
Deputy Managers
Zhang Zhongping i1}' ^
Yuan Jing’an & §?  ffj 
Mine Committee 
Li Shaoji 5?ÜÿlÎ£
Niu Shiyu !& (1931)
Shen Shikui (}i t:ü (1931)
Tang Zaizhang J££f  ^
Zhang Wenfu
Zhang You qr (1931)
Secretary
Tang Zaizhang J^j/b ^
Background
politician*
hanker, close associate of Jiang Jieshi 
hanker (Zhejiang clique)* 
untraced
son of Zhang Yanmou*1
ex chief secretary of Shcnbao, associate
of Jiang Jieshi1’
veteran mine manager
son of Li Yuanhong8
Wuhan industrialist1*
politician, banker, lawyer1
hanker (Zhejiang clique); associate of
Jiang Jieshi’
warlord*
son of Zhang l.ianfen1 
untracedm
banker, close connections with Nanjing" 
see above 
unt raced
Deputy Foreign Minister; friend of Song
Ziwen"
hanker1*
untraced
see above
frimt Guizhou, sponsored by Zhu Qiqian*1 
see above
politician, financial connections'
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Sources:
Membership of Board: identical lists for 1934 and 1936 can be found in 
Zhang and Tan, Zhongxing meikuang, p. 153 and in KYZB 406 (14 
November 1936):346. Entries marked (1931) and those which only appear in 
a government report written by Gu Lang in April 1931 and contained in No 
2 archives 422 (5) 661.
Bibliographical information as follows:
a See text
b North China Herald, 18 June 1921; Zhang and Tan, 'Zhongxing
meikuang’, p. 153; Chen, Gongye shi, p. 322; 'Ye Kuichu’, p. 73. 
c See text.
d Zhang and Tan, 'Zhongxing meikuang’, p. 149; ZMS, p. 41.
e Ibid.
f  See text.
g Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol. 2, p. 346.
h GCMJ, p. 196; Chen, Gongye shi, p. 448. He seems to have been
connected with Zhou Xingtang, another Wuhan industrialist with 
a stake in Zhongxing.
i GCMJ, p. 16; Chen, Gongye shi, p. 321; Fujita Masanori, Gendai
Chugoku jimbutsu hyd (Tokyo, 1969), p. 129. 
j GCMJ, p. 363; Zhang and Tan, 'Zhongxing meikuang’, p. 153.
k Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol. 1, pp. 61-68.
1 Zhang and Tan, 'Zhongxing meikuang’, p. 149.
m But for Zhou Xintang, see text. Zhou Jingtang was probably a
relative.
n Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol. 1, pp. 427-428.
o GCMJ, p. 257.
p Nathan, Peking Politics, p. 250.
q Zhang and Tan, 'Zhongxing meikuang’, p. 149.
r Gaimusho, johobu, Gendai Shina jimmeikan, p. 88.
35
TABLE 3:
MAJOR SHAREHOLDERS IN ZHONGXING IN 1928
Name Nominal value of holdings
(yuan)
Background
Jinzai tang 75 (-.(MX) family corporation of 
Zhu family"
Li Yuanhong 6(X),(XX) warlord and politician’
Zhang Zhongping fiji 450,(XX) son of Zhang Lianfen. 
founder of the company'
Zhang Huaizhi ‘JFttSLS 236, KM) warlord, follower of 
Yuan ShikaiH
Ni Sichong ffâgnîÀf1 235,700 warlord, Anhui clique'
Zhang Xun 2 1(),X(X) warlord
Zhuang Yunjiu 200,000 associate of Pan Fu and 
1 engtian clique“
ZhuQiqian ÿ ï f f i f ï 101 ,(KX) olitician and bureaucrat'
Zhao Frsun 94.600 Qing bureaucrat
Xu Shizhang 90.ÎXX) railway bureaucrat, cousin 
of Xu Shichang1
Ren Fengbao ffiü L ^ 7X,(XX) banker1
Lu Defang 50.(XX) son of warlord 1 at 
Yongxiang
Tian Zhongyu [1] rfj I t 50,(XX) warlord, follower of Xu 
Shichang"1
Yuan Naikuan 40,(XX) cousin of Yuan Shikai"
Wang Zhanyuan F.r1! f t 34,9<X) warlord, Zhili clique’
Pan Fu fg JO,(XX) politician and industrialist, 
Fengtian clique*1
Zhang Jingyao ‘MÇfcgi 27,2(X) warlord. Anhui clique1
Jin Yunpeng Sprlffll 20,(XX) northern politician and 
warlord’
Pan Zihe 20,(XX) un traced
Zhu Yao 3 rM 17,(XX) economic administrator'
Ye Gongzhuo 1 2,4(X) politician, old 
communications clique
Wu Bingxtang 1 2,(XX) politician and industrialist. 
Anhui clique“
Fengshiping Tang 1(),3(X) untraced
Sources: information on shareholding from Zhang, Di wu ci Shandong kuangyc 
haogao, pp. 162-163; clique attributions from Ch i Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in 
China, I9I6-I92H (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), pp. 0  71.
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Sources: information on shareholding from Zhang, Di wu ci Shandong 
kuangye baogao, pp. 162-163; clique attributions from Ch’i Hsi-sheng, 
Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1976), pp. 69-71.
Biographical information as follows:
a Personal communication from Professor Tian Rukang of Fudan
University, Shanghai.
b Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol. 2, pp. 343-346; a different
figure for investment is given in Li Shaofen, “Li Yuanhong shilue” 
(A brief history of Li Yuanhong), Tianjin wenshi ziliao xuangji 11 
(July 1980): 139. Zhang Shuyong, “Li Yuanghong touzi jinrong 
shiye jingji qingkuang” (Li Yuanghong’s investments in finance 
and industry), in Quanguo zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui et al 
eds., Minguo da zongtong Li Yuanhong (Li Yuanghong, President 
of the Republic) (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chuban she, 1991), p. 
302 gives a figure of 540,000 yuan.
c Yang Jialuo, Minguo mingren tujian (Illustrated Biographical
Dictionary of Republican China (Nanjing, 1937), vol. 5, p. 56; 
Zhang and Tan, 'Zhongxing meikuang’, p. 149. 
d GCMJ, p. 226.
e Fujita Masanori, Gendai Chugoku jimbutsu hyo (Biographical
Tables of Modem China) (Tokyo, 1969), pp. 31-32; Ji, 'Ni Sichong 
zai Tianjin de touzi’, passim.
f  Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 141. Zhang had died
in 1923; presumably the shares were held by his family, 
g Qi Xiemin, “Wo suo zhidao de Pan Fu” (The Pan Fu Whom 1
Knew), Tianjin wenshi ziliao xuanji 23 (1983): 188. 
h See text.
i Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 141.
j GCMJ, p. 168.
k Negishi Tadashi, Chukaminkoku jitsugyd-meikan (Industrial
Directory of the Republic of China (Tokyo, 1934), p. 16.
1 JDA Dl/3/1/1; Who’s Who in China, vol. 2, p. 582.
m GCMJ, p. 288.
n Ibid., p. 18.
o H.G.W. Woodhead, ed., China Year Book, 1925, p. 1281; Wang
held 50,000 yuan worth of shares according to Zhao Shixian,
37
' Junfa Wang Zhanyuan jingying gonshangye gaikuang’ (Industrial 
and Commercial Activities of the Warlord Wang Zhanyuan), 
Tianjin wenshi ziliao xuanji 4 (October 1979): 167. 
p GCMJ, p. 319.
q Ibid., p.231.
r Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol. 1, pp. 382-384.
s Gaimusho, Johobu, Gendai Chükaminkoku Manshn teikofcu
jimmeikan (Biographical Dictionary of the Republic of China and 
the Empire of Manchuria) (Tokyo: Toa dobunkai, 1937), p. 213. 
t Boorman, Biographical Dictionary, vol. 4, pp. 31-32.
u GCMJ, pp. 115-116.
TABLE 4: WAGES AT ZHONGXING, 1917-1931 (YUANÎMONTH)
Year Skilled Workers Unskilled Workers
1917 7.84 22.87
1918 7.98 22.21
1919 8.09 27.12
1920 7.64 27.79
1921 7.46 27.56
1922 7.70 28.00
1923 7.96 29.86
1924 7.97 30.23
1925 8.01 28.90
1926 7.90 27.50
1927 8.78 27.49
1928 9.42 31.39
1929 10.82 33.00
1930 11.53 29.37
1931 13.02 26.35
Source: Liu and Shi, “Gongren diaocha”, p. 65.
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